America A World Power 1865-1900
It has now become a fashion, sanctioned by wide usage and by eminent
historians, to speak of America, triumphant over Spain and possessed of
new colonies, as entering the twentieth century in the role of "a world
power," for the first time. Perhaps at this late day, it is useless to
protest against the currency of the idea. Nevertheless, the truth is
that from the fateful moment in March, 1775, when Edmund Burke unfolded
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to his colleagues in the British Parliament the resources of an
invincible America, down to the settlement at Versailles in 1919 closing
the drama of the World War, this nation has been a world power,
influencing by its example, by its institutions, by its wealth, trade,
and arms the course of international affairs. And it should be said also
that neither in the field of commercial enterprise nor in that of
diplomacy has it been wanting in spirit or ingenuity.
When John Hay, Secretary of State, heard that an American citizen,
Perdicaris, had been seized by Raisuli, a Moroccan bandit, in 1904, he
wired his brusque message: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead."
This was but an echo of Commodore Decatur's equally characteristic
answer, "Not a minute," given nearly a hundred years before to the
pirates of Algiers begging for time to consider whether they would cease
preying upon American merchantmen. Was it not as early as 1844 that the
American commissioner, Caleb Cushing, taking advantage of the British
Opium War on China, negotiated with the Celestial Empire a successful
commercial treaty? Did he not then exultantly exclaim: "The laws of the
Union follow its citizens and its banner protects them even within the
domain of the Chinese Empire"? Was it not almost half a century before
the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, that Commodore Perry with an adequate
naval force "gently coerced Japan into friendship with us," leading all
the nations of the earth in the opening of that empire to the trade of
the Occident? Nor is it inappropriate in this connection to recall the
fact that the Monroe Doctrine celebrates in 1923 its hundredth
anniversary.
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1865-98)
French Intrigues in Mexico Blocked
Between the war for the union and
the war with Spain, the Department of State had many an occasion to
present the rights of America among the powers of the world. Only a
little while after the civil conflict came to a close, it was called
upon to deal with a dangerous situation created in Mexico by the
ambitions of Napoleon III. During the administration of Buchanan, Mexico
had fallen into disorder through the strife of the Liberal and the
Clerical parties; the President asked for authority to use American
troops to bring to a peaceful haven "a wreck upon the ocean, drifting
about as she is impelled by different factions." Our own domestic crisis
then intervened.
Observing the United States heavily involved in its own problems, the
great powers, England, France, and Spain, decided in the autumn of 1861
to take a hand themselves in restoring order in Mexico. They entered
into an agreement to enforce the claims of their citizens against Mexico
and to protect their subjects residing in that republic. They invited
the United States to join them, and, on meeting a polite refusal, they
prepared for a combined military and naval demonstration on their own
account. In the midst of this action England and Spain, discovering the
sinister purposes of Napoleon, withdrew their troops and left the field
to him.
The French Emperor, it was well known, looked with jealousy upon the
growth of the United States and dreamed of establishing in the Western
hemisphere an imperial power to offset the American republic.
Intervention to collect debts was only a cloak for his deeper designs.
Throwing off that guise in due time, he made the Archduke Maximilian, a
brother of the ruler of Austria, emperor in Mexico, and surrounded his
throne by French soldiers, in spite of all protests.
This insolent attack upon the Mexican republic, deeply resented in the
United States, was allowed to drift in its course until 1865. At that
juncture General Sheridan was dispatched to the Mexican border with a
large armed force; General Grant urged the use of the American army to
expel the French from this continent. The Secretary of State, Seward,
counseled negotiation first, and, applying the Monroe Doctrine, was able
to prevail upon Napoleon III to withdraw his troops. Without the support
of French arms, the sham empire in Mexico collapsed like a house of
cards and the unhappy Maximilian, the victim of French ambition and
intrigue, met his death at the hands of a Mexican firing squad.
Alaska Purchased
The Mexican affair had not been brought to a close
before the Department of State was busy with negotiations which resulted
in the purchase of Alaska from Russia. The treaty of cession, signed on
March 30, 1867, added to the United States a domain of nearly six
hundred thousand square miles, a territory larger than Texas and nearly
three-fourths the size of the Louisiana purchase. Though it was a
distant colony separated from our continental domain by a thousand miles
of water, no question of "imperialism" or "colonization foreign to
American doctrines" seems to have been raised at the time. The treaty
was ratified promptly by the Senate. The purchase price, $7,200,000, was
voted by the House of Representatives after the display of some
resentment against a system that compelled it to appropriate money to
fulfill an obligation which it had no part in making. Seward, who
formulated the treaty, rejoiced, as he afterwards said, that he had kept
Alaska out of the hands of England.
American Interest in the Caribbean
Having achieved this diplomatic
triumph, Seward turned to the increase of American power in another
direction. He negotiated, with Denmark, a treaty providing for the
purchase of the islands of St. John and St. Thomas in the West Indies,
strategic points in the Caribbean for sea power. This project, long
afterward brought to fruition by other men, was defeated on this
occasion by the refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaty. Evidently it
was not yet prepared to exercise colonial dominion over other races.
Undaunted by the misadventure in Caribbean policies, President Grant
warmly advocated the acquisition of Santo Domingo. This little republic
had long been in a state of general disorder. In 1869 a treaty of
annexation was concluded with its president. The document Grant
transmitted to the Senate with his cordial approval, only to have it
rejected. Not at all changed in his opinion by the outcome of his
effort, he continued to urge the subject of annexation. Even in his last
message to Congress he referred to it, saying that time had only proved
the wisdom of his early course. The addition of Santo Domingo to the
American sphere of protection was the work of a later generation. The
State Department, temporarily checked, had to bide its time.
The Alabama Claims Arbitrated
Indeed, it had in hand a far more
serious matter, a vexing issue that grew out of Civil War diplomacy. The
British government, as already pointed out in other connections, had
permitted Confederate cruisers, including the famous Alabama, built in
British ports, to escape and prey upon the commerce of the Northern
states. This action, denounced at the time by our government as a grave
breach of neutrality as well as a grievous injury to American citizens,
led first to remonstrances and finally to repeated claims for damages
done to American ships and goods. For a long time Great Britain was
firm. Her foreign secretary denied all obligations in the premises,
adding somewhat curtly that "he wished to say once for all that Her
Majesty's government disclaimed any responsibility for the losses and
hoped that they had made their position perfectly clear." Still
President Grant was not persuaded that the door of diplomacy, though
closed, was barred. Hamilton Fish, his Secretary of State, renewed the
demand. Finally he secured from the British government in 1871 the
treaty of Washington providing for the arbitration not merely of the
Alabama and other claims but also all points of serious controversy
between the two countries.
The tribunal of arbitration thus authorized sat at Geneva in
Switzerland, and after a long and careful review of the arguments on
both sides awarded to the United States the lump sum of $15,500,000 to
be distributed among the American claimants. The damages thus allowed
were large, unquestionably larger than strict justice required and it is
not surprising that the decision excited much adverse comment in
England. Nevertheless, the prompt payment by the British government
swept away at once a great cloud of ill-feeling in America. Moreover,
the spectacle of two powerful nations choosing the way of peaceful
arbitration to settle an angry dispute seemed a happy, if illusory, omen
of a modern method for avoiding the arbitrament of war.
Samoa
If the Senate had its doubts at first about the wisdom of
acquiring strategic points for naval power in distant seas, the same
could not be said of the State Department or naval officers. In 1872
Commander Meade, of the United States navy, alive to the importance of
coaling stations even in mid-ocean, made a commercial agreement with the
chief of Tutuila, one of the Samoan Islands, far below the equator, in
the southern Pacific, nearer to Australia than to California. This
agreement, providing among other things for our use of the harbor of
Pago Pago as a naval base, was six years later changed into a formal
treaty ratified by the Senate.
Such enterprise could not escape the vigilant eyes of England and
Germany, both mindful of the course of the sea power in history. The
German emperor, seizing as a pretext a quarrel between his consul in the
islands and a native king, laid claim to an interest in the Samoan
group. England, aware of the dangers arising from German outposts in the
southern seas so near to Australia, was not content to stand aside. So
it happened that all three countries sent battleships to the Samoan
waters, threatening a crisis that was fortunately averted by friendly
settlement. If, as is alleged, Germany entertained a notion of
challenging American sea power then and there, the presence of British
ships must have dispelled that dream.
The result of the affair was a tripartite agreement by which the three
powers in 1889 undertook a protectorate over the islands. But joint
control proved unsatisfactory. There was constant friction between the
Germans and the English. The spheres of authority being vague and open
to dispute, the plan had to be abandoned at the end of ten years.
England withdrew altogether, leaving to Germany all the islands except
Tutuila, which was ceded outright to the United States. Thus one of the
finest harbors in the Pacific, to the intense delight of the American
navy, passed permanently under American dominion. Another triumph in
diplomacy was set down to the credit of the State Department.
Cleveland and the Venezuela Affair
In the relations with South
America, as well as in those with the distant Pacific, the diplomacy of
the government at Washington was put to the test. For some time it had
been watching a dispute between England and Venezuela over the western
boundary of British Guiana and, on an appeal from Venezuela, it had
taken a lively interest in the contest. In 1895 President Cleveland saw
that Great Britain would yield none of her claims. After hearing the
arguments of Venezuela, his Secretary of State, Richard T. Olney, in a
note none too conciliatory, asked the British government whether it was
willing to arbitrate the points in controversy. This inquiry he
accompanied by a warning to the effect that the United States could not
permit any European power to contest its mastery in this hemisphere.
"The United States," said the Secretary, "is practically sovereign on
this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it
confines its interposition.... Its infinite resources, combined with its
isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically
invulnerable against any or all other powers."
The reply evoked from the British government by this strong statement
was firm and clear. The Monroe Doctrine, it said, even if not so widely
stretched by interpretation, was not binding in international law; the
dispute with Venezuela was a matter of interest merely to the parties
involved; and arbitration of the question was impossible. This response
called forth President Cleveland's startling message of 1895. He asked
Congress to create a commission authorized to ascertain by researches
the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. He added that it
would be the duty of this country "to resist by every means in its
power, as a willful aggression upon its rights and interests, the
appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of
governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation,
we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela." The serious character
of this statement he thoroughly understood. He declared that he was
conscious of his responsibilities, intimating that war, much as it was
to be deplored, was not comparable to "a supine submission to wrong and
injustice and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor."
The note of defiance which ran through this message, greeted by shrill
cries of enthusiasm in many circles, was viewed in other quarters as a
portent of war. Responsible newspapers in both countries spoke of an
armed settlement of the dispute as inevitable. Congress created the
commission and appropriated money for the investigation; a body of
learned men was appointed to determine the merits of the conflicting
boundary claims. The British government, deaf to the clamor of the
bellicose section of the London press, deplored the incident,
courteously replied in the affirmative to a request for assistance in
the search for evidence, and finally agreed to the proposition that the
issue be submitted to arbitration. The outcome of this somewhat perilous
dispute contributed not a little to Cleveland's reputation as "a
sterling representative of the true American spirit." This was not
diminished when the tribunal of arbitration found that Great Britain was
on the whole right in her territorial claims against Venezuela.
The Annexation of Hawaii
While engaged in the dangerous Venezuela
controversy, President Cleveland was compelled by a strange turn in
events to consider the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in the
mid-Pacific. For more than half a century American missionaries had been
active in converting the natives to the Christian faith and enterprising
American business men had been developing the fertile sugar plantations.
Both the Department of State and the Navy Department were fully
conscious of the strategic relation of the islands to the growth of sea
power and watched with anxiety any developments likely to bring them
under some other Dominion.
The country at large was indifferent, however, until 1893, when a
revolution, headed by Americans, broke out, ending in the overthrow of
the native government, the abolition of the primitive monarchy, and the
retirement of Queen Liliuokalani to private life. This crisis, a
repetition of the Texas affair in a small theater, was immediately
followed by a demand from the new Hawaiian government for annexation to
the United States. President Harrison looked with favor on the proposal,
negotiated the treaty of annexation, and laid it before the Senate for
approval. There it still rested when his term of office was brought to a
close.
Harrison's successor, Cleveland, it was well known, had doubts about the
propriety of American action in Hawaii. For the purpose of making an
inquiry into the matter, he sent a special commissioner to the islands.
On the basis of the report of his agent, Cleveland came to the
conclusion that "the revolution in the island kingdom had been
accomplished by the improper use of the armed forces of the United
States and that the wrong should be righted by a restoration of the
queen to her throne." Such being his matured conviction, though the
facts upon which he rested it were warmly controverted, he could do
nothing but withdraw the treaty from the Senate and close the incident.
To the Republicans this sharp and cavalier disposal of their plans,
carried out in a way that impugned the motives of a Republican
President, was nothing less than "a betrayal of American interests." In
their platform of 1896 they made clear their position: "Our foreign
policy should be at all times firm, vigorous, and dignified and all our
interests in the Western hemisphere carefully watched and guarded. The
Hawaiian Islands should be controlled by the United States and no
foreign power should be permitted to interfere with them." There was no
mistaking this view of the issue. As the vote in the election gave
popular sanction to Republican policies, Congress by a joint resolution,
passed on July 6, 1898, annexed the islands to the United States and
later conferred upon them the ordinary territorial form of government.
CUBA AND THE SPANISH WAR
Early American Relations with Cuba
The year that brought Hawaii
finally under the American flag likewise drew to a conclusion another
long controversy over a similar outpost in the Atlantic, one of the last
remnants of the once glorious Spanish empire--the island of Cuba.
For a century the Department of State had kept an anxious eye upon this
base of power, knowing full well that both France and England, already
well established in the West Indies, had their attention also fixed upon
Cuba. In the administration of President Fillmore they had united in
proposing to the United States a tripartite treaty guaranteeing Spain in
her none too certain ownership. This proposal, squarely rejected,
furnished the occasion for a statement of American policy which stood
the test of all the years that followed; namely, that the affair was one
between Spain and the United States alone.
In that long contest in the United States for the balance of power
between the North and South, leaders in the latter section often thought
of bringing Cuba into the union to offset the free states. An
opportunity to announce their purposes publicly was afforded in 1854 by
a controversy over the seizure of an American ship by Cuban authorities.
On that occasion three American ministers abroad, stationed at Madrid,
Paris, and London respectively, held a conference and issued the
celebrated "Ostend Manifesto." They united in declaring that Cuba, by
her geographical position, formed a part of the United States, that
possession by a foreign power was inimical to American interests, and
that an effort should be made to purchase the island from Spain. In case
the owner refused to sell, they concluded, with a menacing flourish, "by
every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from
Spain if we possess the power." This startling proclamation to the world
was promptly disowned by the United States government.
Revolutions in Cuba
For nearly twenty years afterwards the Cuban
question rested. Then it was revived in another form during President
Grant's administrations, when the natives became engaged in a
destructive revolt against Spanish officials. For ten years--1868-78--a
guerrilla warfare raged in the island. American citizens, by virtue of
their ancient traditions of democracy, naturally sympathized with a war
for independence and self-government. Expeditions to help the insurgents
were fitted out secretly in American ports. Arms and supplies were
smuggled into Cuba. American soldiers of fortune joined their ranks. The
enforcement of neutrality against the friends of Cuban independence, no
pleasing task for a sympathetic President, the protection of American
lives and property in the revolutionary area, and similar matters kept
our government busy with Cuba for a whole decade.
A brief lull in Cuban disorders was followed in 1895 by a renewal of the
revolutionary movement. The contest between the rebels and the Spanish
troops, marked by extreme cruelty and a total disregard for life and
property, exceeded all bounds of decency, and once more raised the old
questions that had tormented Grant's administration. Gomez, the leader
of the revolt, intent upon provoking American interference, laid waste
the land with fire and sword. By a proclamation of November 6, 1895, he
ordered the destruction of sugar plantations and railway connections and
the closure of all sugar factories. The work of ruin was completed by
the ruthless Spanish general, Weyler, who concentrated the inhabitants
from rural regions into military camps, where they died by the hundreds
of disease and starvation. Stories of the atrocities, bad enough in
simple form, became lurid when transmuted into American news and deeply
moved the sympathies of the American people. Sermons were preached about
Spanish misdeeds; orators demanded that the Cubans be sustained "in
their heroic struggle for independence"; newspapers, scouting the
ordinary forms of diplomatic negotiation, spurned mediation and demanded
intervention and war if necessary.
President Cleveland's Policy
Cleveland chose the way of peace. He
ordered the observance of the rule of neutrality. He declined to act on
a resolution of Congress in favor of giving to the Cubans the rights of
belligerents. Anxious to bring order to the distracted island, he
tendered to Spain the good offices of the United States as mediator in
the contest--a tender rejected by the Spanish government with the broad
hint that President Cleveland might be more vigorous in putting a stop
to the unlawful aid in money, arms, and supplies, afforded to the
insurgents by American sympathizers. Thereupon the President returned to
the course he had marked out for himself, leaving "the public nuisance"
to his successor, President McKinley.
Republican Policies
The Republicans in 1897 found themselves in a
position to employ that "firm, vigorous, and dignified" foreign policy
which they had approved in their platform. They had declared: "The
government of Spain having lost control of Cuba and being unable to
protect the property or lives of resident American citizens or to comply
with its treaty obligations, we believe that the government of the
United States should actively use its influence and good offices to
restore peace and give independence to the island." The American
property in Cuba to which the Republicans referred in their platform
amounted by this time to more than fifty million dollars; the commerce
with the island reached more than one hundred millions annually; and the
claims of American citizens against Spain for property destroyed totaled
sixteen millions. To the pleas of humanity which made such an effective
appeal to the hearts of the American people, there were thus added
practical considerations of great weight.
President McKinley Negotiates
In the face of the swelling tide of
popular opinion in favor of quick, drastic, and positive action,
McKinley chose first the way of diplomacy. A short time after his
inauguration he lodged with the Spanish government a dignified protest
against its policies in Cuba, thus opening a game of thrust and parry
with the suave ministers at Madrid. The results of the exchange of
notes were the recall of the obnoxious General Weyler, the appointment
of a governor-general less bloodthirsty in his methods, a change in the
policy of concentrating civilians in military camps, and finally a
promise of "home rule" for Cuba. There is no doubt that the Spanish
government was eager to avoid a war that could have but one outcome. The
American minister at Madrid, General Woodford, was convinced that firm
and patient pressure would have resulted in the final surrender of Cuba
by the Spanish government.
The De Lome and the Maine Incidents
Such a policy was defeated by
events. In February, 1898, a private letter written by Senor de Lome,
the Spanish ambassador at Washington, expressing contempt for the
President of the United States, was filched from the mails and passed
into the hands of a journalist, William R. Hearst, who published it to
the world. In the excited state of American opinion, few gave heed to
the grave breach of diplomatic courtesy committed by breaking open
private correspondence. The Spanish government was compelled to recall
De Lome, thus officially condemning his conduct.
At this point a far more serious crisis put the pacific relations of the
two negotiating countries in dire peril. On February 15, the battleship
Maine, riding in the harbor of Havana, was blown up and sunk, carrying
to death two officers and two hundred and fifty-eight members of the
crew. This tragedy, ascribed by the American public to the malevolence
of Spanish officials, profoundly stirred an already furious nation.
When, on March 21, a commission of inquiry reported that the ill-fated
ship had been blown up by a submarine mine which had in turn set off
some of the ship's magazines, the worst suspicions seemed confirmed. If
any one was inclined to be indifferent to the Cuban war for
independence, he was now met by the vehement cry: "Remember the
Maine!"
Spanish Concessions
Still the State Department, under McKinley's
steady hand, pursued the path of negotiation, Spain proving more pliable
and more ready with promises of reform in the island. Early in April,
however, there came a decided change in the tenor of American diplomacy.
On the 4th, McKinley, evidently convinced that promises did not mean
performances, instructed our minister at Madrid to warn the Spanish
government that as no effective armistice had been offered to the
Cubans, he would lay the whole matter before Congress. This decision,
every one knew, from the temper of Congress, meant war--a prospect which
excited all the European powers. The Pope took an active interest in the
crisis. France and Germany, foreseeing from long experience in world
politics an increase of American power and prestige through war, sought
to prevent it. Spain, hopeless and conscious of her weakness, at last
dispatched to the President a note promising to suspend hostilities, to
call a Cuban parliament, and to grant all the autonomy that could be
reasonably asked.
President McKinley Calls for War
For reasons of his own--reasons
which have never yet been fully explained--McKinley ignored the final
program of concessions presented by Spain. At the very moment when his
patient negotiations seemed to bear full fruit, he veered sharply from
his course and launched the country into the war by sending to Congress
his militant message of April 11, 1898. Without making public the last
note he had received from Spain, he declared that he was brought to the
end of his effort and the cause was in the hands of Congress. Humanity,
the protection of American citizens and property, the injuries to
American commerce and business, the inability of Spain to bring about
permanent peace in the island--these were the grounds for action that
induced him to ask for authority to employ military and naval forces in
establishing a stable government in Cuba. They were sufficient for a
public already straining at the leash.
The Resolution of Congress
There was no doubt of the outcome when
the issue was withdrawn from diplomacy and placed in charge of Congress.
Resolutions were soon introduced into the House of Representatives
authorizing the President to employ armed force in securing peace and
order in the island and "establishing by the free action of the people
thereof a stable and independent government of their own." To the form
and spirit of this proposal the Democrats and Populists took exception.
In the Senate, where they were stronger, their position had to be
reckoned with by the narrow Republican majority. As the resolution
finally read, the independence of Cuba was recognized; Spain was called
upon to relinquish her authority and withdraw from the island; and the
President was empowered to use force to the extent necessary to carry
the resolutions into effect. Furthermore the United States disclaimed
"any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or
control over said island except for the pacification thereof." Final
action was taken by Congress on April 19, 1898, and approved by the
President on the following day.
War and Victory
Startling events then followed in swift succession.
The navy, as a result in no small measure of the alertness of Theodore
Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Department, was ready for the
trial by battle. On May 1, Commodore Dewey at Manila Bay shattered the
Spanish fleet, marking the doom of Spanish dominion in the Philippines.
On July 3, the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera, in attempting to
escape from Havana, was utterly destroyed by American forces under
Commodore Schley. On July 17, Santiago, invested by American troops
under General Shafter and shelled by the American ships, gave up the
struggle. On July 25 General Miles landed in Porto Rico. On August 13,
General Merritt and Admiral Dewey carried Manila by storm. The war was
over.
The Peace Protocol
Spain had already taken cognizance of stern
facts. As early as July 26, 1898, acting through the French ambassador,
M. Cambon, the Madrid government approached President McKinley for a
statement of the terms on which hostilities could be brought to a close.
After some skirmishing Spain yielded reluctantly to the ultimatum. On
August 12, the preliminary peace protocol was signed, stipulating that
Cuba should be free, Porto Rico ceded to the United States, and Manila
occupied by American troops pending the formal treaty of peace. On
October 1, the commissioners of the two countries met at Paris to bring
about the final settlement.
Peace Negotiations
When the day for the first session of the
conference arrived, the government at Washington apparently had not made
up its mind on the final disposition of the Philippines. Perhaps, before
the battle of Manila Bay, not ten thousand people in the United States
knew or cared where the Philippines were. Certainly there was in the
autumn of 1898 no decided opinion as to what should be done with the
fruits of Dewey's victory. President McKinley doubtless voiced the
sentiment of the people when he stated to the peace commissioners on the
eve of their departure that there had originally been no thought of
conquest in the Pacific.
The march of events, he added, had imposed new duties on the country.
"Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines," he said, "is the
commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be
indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the
enlargement of American trade." On this ground he directed the
commissioners to accept not less than the cession of the island of
Luzon, the chief of the Philippine group, with its harbor of Manila. It
was not until the latter part of October that he definitely instructed
them to demand the entire archipelago, on the theory that the occupation
of Luzon alone could not be justified "on political, commercial, or
humanitarian grounds." This departure from the letter of the peace
protocol was bitterly resented by the Spanish agents. It was with
heaviness of heart that they surrendered the last sign of Spain's
ancient dominion in the far Pacific.
The Final Terms of Peace
The treaty of peace, as finally agreed
upon, embraced the following terms: the independence of Cuba; the
cession of Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States;
the settlement of claims filed by the citizens of both countries; the
payment of twenty million dollars to Spain by the United States for the
Philippines; and the determination of the status of the inhabitants of
the ceded territories by Congress. The great decision had been made. Its
issue was in the hands of the Senate where the Democrats and the
Populists held the balance of power under the requirement of the
two-thirds vote for ratification.
The Contest in America over the Treaty of Peace
The publication of
the treaty committing the United States to the administration of distant
colonies directed the shifting tides of public opinion into two distinct
channels: support of the policy and opposition to it. The trend in
Republican leadership, long in the direction marked out by the treaty,
now came into the open. Perhaps a majority of the men highest in the
councils of that party had undergone the change of heart reflected in
the letters of John Hay, Secretary of State. In August of 1898 he had
hinted, in a friendly letter to Andrew Carnegie, that he sympathized
with the latter's opposition to "imperialism"; but he had added quickly:
"The only question in my mind is how far it is now possible for us to
withdraw from the Philippines." In November of the same year he wrote to
Whitelaw Reid, one of the peace commissioners at Paris: "There is a wild
and frantic attack now going on in the press against the whole
Philippine transaction. Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his
head.... But all this confusion of tongues will go its way. The country
will applaud the resolution that has been reached and you will return in
the role of conquering heroes with your 'brows bound with oak.'"
Senator Beveridge of Indiana and Senator Platt of Connecticut, accepting
the verdict of history as the proof of manifest destiny, called for
unquestioning support of the administration in its final step. "Every
expansion of our territory," said the latter, "has been in accordance
with the irresistible law of growth. We could no more resist the
successive expansions by which we have grown to be the strongest nation
on earth than a tree can resist its growth. The history of territorial
expansion is the history of our nation's progress and glory. It is a
matter to be proud of, not to lament. We should rejoice that Providence
has given us the opportunity to extend our influence, our institutions,
and our civilization into regions hitherto closed to us, rather than
contrive how we can thwart its designs."
This doctrine was savagely attacked by opponents of McKinley's policy,
many a stanch Republican joining with the majority of Democrats in
denouncing the treaty as a departure from the ideals of the republic.
Senator Vest introduced in the Senate a resolution that "under the
Constitution of the United States, no power is given to the federal
Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as
colonies." Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, whose long and honorable
career gave weight to his lightest words, inveighed against the whole
procedure and to the end of his days believed that the new drift into
rivalry with European nations as a colonial power was fraught with
genuine danger. "Our imperialistic friends," he said, "seem to have
forgotten the use of the vocabulary of liberty. They talk about giving
good government. 'We shall give them such a government as we think they
are fitted for.' 'We shall give them a better government than they had
before.' Why, Mr. President, that one phrase conveys to a free man and a
free people the most stinging of insults. In that little phrase, as in a
seed, is contained the germ of all despotism and of all tyranny.
Government is not a gift. Free government is not to be given by all the
blended powers of earth and heaven. It is a birthright. It belongs, as
our fathers said, and as their children said, as Jefferson said, and as
President McKinley said, to human nature itself."
The Senate, more conservative on the question of annexation than the
House of Representatives composed of men freshly elected in the stirring
campaign of 1896, was deliberate about ratification of the treaty. The
Democrats and Populists were especially recalcitrant. Mr. Bryan hurried
to Washington and brought his personal influence to bear in favor of
speedy action. Patriotism required ratification, it was said in one
quarter. The country desires peace and the Senate ought not to delay, it
was urged in another. Finally, on February 6, 1899, the requisite
majority of two-thirds was mustered, many a Senator who voted for the
treaty, however, sharing the misgivings of Senator Hoar as to the
"dangers of imperialism." Indeed at the time, the Senators passed a
resolution declaring that the policy to be adopted in the Philippines
was still an open question, leaving to the future, in this way, the
possibility of retracing their steps.
The Attitude of England
The Spanish war, while accomplishing the
simple objects of those who launched the nation on that course, like all
other wars, produced results wholly unforeseen. In the first place, it
exercised a profound influence on the drift of opinion among European
powers. In England, sympathy with the United States was from the first
positive and outspoken. "The state of feeling here," wrote Mr. Hay, then
ambassador in London, "is the best I have ever known. From every quarter
the evidences of it come to me. The royal family by habit and tradition
are most careful not to break the rules of strict neutrality, but even
among them I find nothing but hearty kindness and--so far as is
consistent with propriety--sympathy. Among the political leaders on both
sides I find not only sympathy but a somewhat eager desire that 'the
other fellows' shall not seem more friendly."
Joseph Chamberlain, the distinguished Liberal statesman, thinking no
doubt of the continental situation, said in a political address at the
very opening of the war that the next duty of Englishmen "is to
establish and maintain bonds of permanent unity with our kinsmen across
the Atlantic.... I even go so far as to say that, terrible as war may
be, even war would be cheaply purchased if, in a great and noble cause,
the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an
Anglo-Saxon alliance." To the American ambassador he added
significantly that he did not "care a hang what they say about it on the
continent," which was another way of expressing the hope that the
warning to Germany and France was sufficient. This friendly English
opinion, so useful to the United States when a combination of powers to
support Spain was more than possible, removed all fears as to the
consequences of the war. Henry Adams, recalling days of humiliation in
London during the Civil War, when his father was the American
ambassador, coolly remarked that it was "the sudden appearance of
Germany as the grizzly terror" that "frightened England into America's
arms"; but the net result in keeping the field free for an easy triumph
of American arms was none the less appreciated in Washington where,
despite outward calm, fears of European complications were never absent.
AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE ORIENT
The Filipino Revolt against American Rule
In the sphere of domestic
politics, as well as in the field of foreign relations, the outcome of
the Spanish war exercised a marked influence. It introduced at once
problems of colonial administration and difficulties in adjusting trade
relations with the outlying dominions. These were furthermore
complicated in the very beginning by the outbreak of an insurrection
against American sovereignty in the Philippines. The leader of the
revolt, Aguinaldo, had been invited to join the American forces in
overthrowing Spanish dominion, and he had assumed, apparently without
warrant, that independence would be the result of the joint operations.
When the news reached him that the American flag had been substituted
for the Spanish flag, his resentment was keen. In February, 1899, there
occurred a slight collision between his men and some American soldiers.
The conflict thus begun was followed by serious fighting which finally
dwindled into a vexatious guerrilla warfare lasting three years and
costing heavily in men and money. Atrocities were committed by the
native insurrectionists and, sad to relate, they were repaid in kind;
it was argued in defense of the army that the ordinary rules of warfare
were without terror to men accustomed to fighting like savages. In vain
did McKinley assure the Filipinos that the institutions and laws
established in the islands would be designed "not for our satisfaction
or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands." Nothing
short of military pressure could bring the warring revolutionists to
terms.
Attacks on Republican "Imperialism."--The Filipino insurrection,
following so quickly upon the ratification of the treaty with Spain,
moved the American opponents of McKinley's colonial policies to redouble
their denunciation of what they were pleased to call "imperialism."
Senator Hoar was more than usually caustic in his indictment of the new
course. The revolt against American rule did but convince him of the
folly hidden in the first fateful measures. Everywhere he saw a
conspiracy of silence and injustice. "I have failed to discover in the
speeches, public or private, of the advocates of this war," he contended
in the Senate, "or in the press which supports it and them, a single
expression anywhere of a desire to do justice to the people of the
Philippine Islands, or of a desire to make known to the people of the
United States the truth of the case.... The catchwords, the cries, the
pithy and pregnant phrases of which their speech is full, all mean
dominion. They mean perpetual dominion.... There is not one of these
gentlemen who will rise in his place and affirm that if he were a
Filipino he would not do exactly as the Filipinos are doing; that he
would not despise them if they were to do otherwise. So much at least
they owe of respect to the dead and buried history--the dead and buried
history so far as they can slay and bury it--of their country." In the
way of practical suggestions, the Senator offered as a solution of the
problem: the recognition of independence, assistance in establishing
self-government, and an invitation to all powers to join in a guarantee
of freedom to the islands.
The Republican Answer
To McKinley and his supporters, engaged in a
sanguinary struggle to maintain American supremacy, such talk was more
than quixotic; it was scarcely short of treasonable. They pointed out
the practical obstacles in the way of uniform self-government for a
collection of seven million people ranging in civilization from the most
ignorant hill men to the highly cultivated inhabitants of Manila. The
incidents of the revolt and its repression, they admitted, were painful
enough; but still nothing as compared with the chaos that would follow
the attempt of a people who had never had experience in such matters to
set up and sustain democratic institutions. They preferred rather the
gradual process of fitting the inhabitants of the islands for
self-government. This course, in their eyes, though less poetic, was
more in harmony with the ideals of humanity. Having set out upon it,
they pursued it steadfastly to the end. First, they applied force
without stint to the suppression of the revolt. Then they devoted such
genius for colonial administration as they could command to the
development of civil government, commerce, and industry.
The Boxer Rebellion in China
For a nation with a world-wide trade,
steadily growing, as the progress of home industries redoubled the zeal
for new markets, isolation was obviously impossible. Never was this
clearer than in 1900 when a native revolt against foreigners in China,
known as the Boxer uprising, compelled the United States to join with
the powers of Europe in a military expedition and a diplomatic
settlement. The Boxers, a Chinese association, had for some time carried
on a campaign of hatred against all aliens in the Celestial empire,
calling upon the natives to rise in patriotic wrath and drive out the
foreigners who, they said, "were lacerating China like tigers." In the
summer of 1900 the revolt flamed up in deeds of cruelty. Missionaries
and traders were murdered in the provinces; foreign legations were
stoned; the German ambassador, one of the most cordially despised
foreigners, was killed in the streets of Peking; and to all appearances
a frightful war of extermination had begun. In the month of June nearly
five hundred men, women, and children, representing all nations, were
besieged in the British quarters in Peking under constant fire of
Chinese guns and in peril of a terrible death.
Intervention in China
Nothing but the arrival of armed forces, made
up of Japanese, Russian, British, American, French, and German soldiers
and marines, prevented the destruction of the beleaguered aliens. When
once the foreign troops were in possession of the Chinese capital,
diplomatic questions of the most delicate character arose. For more than
half a century, the imperial powers of Europe had been carving up the
Chinese empire, taking to themselves territory, railway concessions,
mining rights, ports, and commercial privileges at the expense of the
huge but helpless victim. The United States alone among the great
nations, while as zealous as any in the pursuit of peaceful trade, had
refrained from seizing Chinese territory or ports. Moreover, the
Department of State had been urging European countries to treat China
with fairness, to respect her territorial integrity, and to give her
equal trading privileges with all nations.
The American Policy of the "Open Door."--In the autumn of 1899,
Secretary Hay had addressed to London, Berlin, Rome, Paris, Tokyo, and
St. Petersburg his famous note on the "open door" policy in China. In
this document he proposed that existing treaty ports and vested
interests of the several foreign countries should be respected; that
the Chinese government should be permitted to extend its tariffs to all
ports held by alien powers except the few free ports; and that there
should be no discrimination in railway and port charges among the
citizens of foreign countries operating in the empire. To these
principles the governments addressed by Mr. Hay, finally acceded with
evident reluctance.
On this basis he then proposed the settlement that had to follow the
Boxer uprising. "The policy of the Government of the United States," he
said to the great powers, in the summer of 1900, "is to seek a solution
which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve
Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights
guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with
all parts of the Chinese empire." This was a friendly warning to the
world that the United States would not join in a scramble to punish the
Chinese by carving out more territory. "The moment we acted," said Mr.
Hay, "the rest of the world paused and finally came over to our ground;
and the German government, which is generally brutal but seldom silly,
recovered its senses, and climbed down off its perch."
In taking this position, the Secretary of State did but reflect the
common sense of America. "We are, of course," he explained, "opposed to
the dismemberment of that empire and we do not think that the public
opinion of the United States would justify this government in taking
part in the great game of spoliation now going on." Heavy damages were
collected by the European powers from China for the injuries inflicted
upon their citizens by the Boxers; but the United States, finding the
sum awarded in excess of the legitimate claims, returned the balance in
the form of a fund to be applied to the education of Chinese students in
American universities. "I would rather be, I think," said Mr. Hay, "the
dupe of China than the chum of the Kaiser." By pursuing a liberal
policy, he strengthened the hold of the United States upon the
affections of the Chinese people and, in the long run, as he remarked
himself, safeguarded "our great commercial interests in that Empire."
Imperialism in the Presidential Campaign of 1900
It is not strange
that the policy pursued by the Republican administration in disposing of
the questions raised by the Spanish War became one of the first issues
in the presidential campaign of 1900. Anticipating attacks from every
quarter, the Republicans, in renominating McKinley, set forth their
position in clear and ringing phrases: "In accepting by the treaty of
Paris the just responsibility of our victories in the Spanish War the
President and Senate won the undoubted approval of the American people.
No other course was possible than to destroy Spain's sovereignty
throughout the West Indies and in the Philippine Islands. That course
created our responsibility, before the world and with the unorganized
population whom our intervention had freed from Spain, to provide for
the maintenance of law and order, and for the establishment of good
government and for the performance of international obligations. Our
authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever
sovereign rights were extended it became the high duty of the government
to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection, and to confer
the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued peoples.
The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and
our duties shall be secured to them by law." To give more strength to
their ticket, the Republican convention, in a whirlwind of enthusiasm,
nominated for the vice presidency, against his protest, Theodore
Roosevelt, the governor of New York and the hero of the Rough Riders, so
popular on account of their Cuban campaign.
The Democrats, as expected, picked up the gauntlet thrown down with such
defiance by the Republicans. Mr. Bryan, whom they selected as their
candidate, still clung to the currency issue; but the main emphasis,
both of the platform and the appeal for votes, was on the "imperialistic
program" of the Republican administration. The Democrats denounced the
treatment of Cuba and Porto Rico and condemned the Philippine policy in
sharp and vigorous terms. "As we are not willing," ran the platform, "to
surrender our civilization or to convert the Republic into an empire, we
favor an immediate declaration of the Nation's purpose to give to the
Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence;
third, protection from outside interference.... The greedy commercialism
which dictated the Philippine policy of the Republican administration
attempts to justify it with the plea that it will pay, but even this
sordid and unworthy plea fails when brought to the test of facts. The
war of 'criminal aggression' against the Filipinos entailing an annual
expense of many millions has already cost more than any possible profit
that could accrue from the entire Philippine trade for years to come....
We oppose militarism. It means conquest abroad and intimidation and
oppression at home. It means the strong arm which has ever been fatal to
free institutions. It is what millions of our citizens have fled from in
Europe. It will impose upon our peace-loving people a large standing
army, an unnecessary burden of taxation, and would be a constant menace
to their liberties." Such was the tenor of their appeal to the voters.
With the issues clearly joined, the country rejected the Democratic
candidate even more positively than four years before. The popular vote
cast for McKinley was larger and that cast for Bryan smaller than in the
silver election. Thus vindicated at the polls, McKinley turned with
renewed confidence to the development of the policies he had so far
advanced. But fate cut short his designs. In the September following his
second inauguration, he was shot by an anarchist while attending the
Buffalo exposition. "What a strange and tragic fate it has been of
mine," wrote the Secretary of State, John Hay, on the day of the
President's death, "to stand by the bier of three of my dearest friends,
Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley, three of the gentlest of men, all risen
to the head of the state and all done to death by assassins." On
September 14, 1901, the Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt, took up the
lines of power that had fallen from the hands of his distinguished
chief, promising to continue "absolutely unbroken" the policies he had
inherited.
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL GROWTH AND WORLD POLITICS
The economic aspects of the period between 1865 and 1900 may be readily
summed up: the recovery of the South from the ruin of the Civil War, the
extension of the railways, the development of the Great West, and the
triumph of industry and business enterprise. In the South many of the
great plantations were broken up and sold in small farms, crops were
diversified, the small farming class was raised in the scale of social
importance, the cotton industry was launched, and the coal, iron,
timber, and other resources were brought into use. In the West the free
arable land was practically exhausted by 1890 under the terms of the
Homestead Act; gold, silver, copper, coal and other minerals were
discovered in abundance; numerous rail connections were formed with the
Atlantic seaboard; the cowboy and the Indian were swept away before a
standardized civilization of electric lights and bathtubs. By the end of
the century the American frontier had disappeared. The wild, primitive
life so long associated with America was gone. The unity of the nation
was established.
In the field of business enterprise, progress was most marked. The
industrial system, which had risen and flourished before the Civil War,
grew into immense proportions and the industrial area was extended from
the Northeast into all parts of the country. Small business concerns
were transformed into huge corporations. Individual plants were merged
under the management of gigantic trusts. Short railway lines were
consolidated into national systems. The industrial population of
wage-earners rose into the tens of millions. The immigration of aliens
increased by leaps and bounds. The cities overshadowed the country. The
nation that had once depended upon Europe for most of its manufactured
goods became a competitor of Europe in the markets of the earth.
In the sphere of politics, the period witnessed the recovery of white
supremacy in the South; the continued discussion of the old questions,
such as the currency, the tariff, and national banking; and the
injection of new issues like the trusts and labor problems. As of old,
foreign affairs were kept well at the front. Alaska was purchased from
Russia; attempts were made to extend American influence in the Caribbean
region; a Samoan island was brought under the flag; and the Hawaiian
islands were annexed. The Monroe Doctrine was applied with vigor in the
dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain.
Assistance was given to the Cubans in their revolutionary struggle
against Spain and thus there was precipitated a war which ended in the
annexation of Porto Rico and the Philippines. American influence in the
Pacific and the Orient was so enlarged as to be a factor of great weight
in world affairs. Thus questions connected with foreign and "imperial"
policies were united with domestic issues to make up the warp and woof
of politics. In the direction of affairs, the Republicans took the
leadership, for they held the presidency during all the years, except
eight, between 1865 and 1900.