The Kingdom 1908-13

(cf. Chaps. 14, 20)





The events which have taken place in Bulgaria since 1908 hinge on the

Macedonian question, which has not till now been mentioned. The Macedonian

question was extremely complicated; it started on the assumption that the

disintegration of Turkey, which had been proceeding throughout the

nineteenth century, would eventually be completed, and the question was

how in this even uality to satisfy the territorial claims of the three

neighbouring countries, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, claims both

historical and ethnological, based on the numbers and distribution of

their 'unredeemed' compatriots in Macedonia, and at the same time avoid

causing the armed interference of Europe.



The beginnings of the Macedonian question in its modern form do not go

farther back than 1885, when the ease with which eastern Rumelia (i.e.

southern Bulgaria) threw off the Turkish yoke and was spontaneously united

with the semi-independent principality of northern Bulgaria affected the

imagination of the Balkan statesmen. From that time Sofia began to cast

longing eyes on Macedonia, the whole of which was claimed as 'unredeemed

Bulgaria', and Stambulov's last success in 1894 was to obtain from Turkey

the consent to the establishment of two bishops of the Bulgarian

(Exarchist) Church in Macedonia, which was a heavy blow for the Greek

Patriarchate at Constantinople.



Macedonia had been envisaged by the Treaty of Berlin, article 23 of which

stipulated for reforms in that province; but in those days the Balkan

States were too young and weak to worry themselves or the European powers

over the troubles of their co-religionists in Turkey; their hands were

more than full setting their own houses in some sort of order, and it was

in nobody's interest to reform Macedonia, so article 23 remained the

expression of a philanthropic sentiment. This indifference on the part of

Europe left the door open for the Balkan States, as soon as they had

energy to spare, to initiate their campaign for extending their spheres of

influence in Macedonia.



From 1894 onwards Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia increased, and the

Bulgarians were soon followed by Greeks and Serbians. The reason for this

passionate pegging out of claims and the bitter rivalry of the three

nations which it engendered was the following: The population of Macedonia

was nowhere, except in the immediate vicinity of the borders of these

three countries, either purely Bulgar or purely Greek or purely Serb; most

of the towns contained a percentage of at least two of these

nationalities, not to mention the Turks (who after all were still the

owners of the country by right of conquest), Albanians, Tartars, Rumanians

(Vlakhs), and others; the city of Salonika was and is almost purely

Jewish, while in the country districts Turkish, Albanian, Greek, Bulgar,

and Serb villages were inextricably confused. Generally speaking, the

coastal strip was mainly Greek (the coast itself purely so), the interior

mainly Slav. The problem was for each country to peg out as large a claim

as possible, and so effectively, by any means in their power, to make the

majority of the population contained in that claim acknowledge itself to

be Bulgar, or Serb, or Greek, that when the agony of the Ottoman Empire

was over, each part of Macedonia would automatically fall into the arms of

its respective deliverers. The game was played through the appropriate

media of churches and schools, for the unfortunate Macedonian peasants had

first of all to be enlightened as to who they were, or rather as to who

they were told they had got to consider themselves, while the Church, as

always, conveniently covered a multitude of political aims; when those

methods flagged, a bomb would be thrown at, let us say, a Turkish official

by an agent provocateur of one of the three players, inevitably

resulting in the necessary massacre of innocent Christians by the

ostensibly brutal but really equally innocent Turks, and an outcry in the

European press.



Bulgaria was first in the field and had a considerable start of the other

two rivals. The Bulgars claimed the whole of Macedonia, including Salonika

and all the Aegean coast (except Chalcidice), Okhrida, and Monastir;

Greece claimed all southern Macedonia, and Serbia parts of northern and

central Macedonia known as Old Serbia. The crux of the whole problem was,

and is, that the claims of Serbia and Greece do not clash, while that of

Bulgaria, driving a thick wedge between Greece and Serbia, and thus giving

Bulgaria the undoubted hegemony of the peninsula, came into irreconcilable

conflict with those of its rivals. The importance of this point was

greatly emphasized by the existence of the Nish-Salonika railway, which is

Serbia's only direct outlet to the sea, and runs through Macedonia from

north to south, following the right or western bank of the river Vardar.

Should Bulgaria straddle that, Serbia would be economically at its mercy,

just as in the north it was already, to its bitter cost, at the mercy of

Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, Bulgarian propaganda had been so effectual

that Serbia and Greece never expected they would eventually be able to

join hands so easily and successfully as they afterwards did.



The then unknown quantity of Albania was also a factor. This people,

though small in numbers, was formidable in character, and had never been

effectually subdued by the Turks. They would have been glad to have a

boundary contiguous with that of Bulgaria (with whom they had no quarrel)

as a support against their hereditary enemies, Serbs in the north and

Greeks in the south, who were more than inclined to encroach on their

territory. The population of Macedonia, being still under Turkish rule,

was uneducated and ignorant; needless to say it had no national

consciousness, though this was less true of the Greeks than of the Slavs.

It is the Slav population of Macedonia that has engendered so much heat

and caused so much blood to be spilt. The dispute as to whether it is

rather Serb or Bulgar has caused interminable and most bitter controversy.

The truth is that it was neither the one nor the other, but that, the

ethnological and linguistic missionaries of Bulgaria having been first in

the field, a majority of the Macedonian Slavs had been so long and so

persistently told that they were Bulgars, that after a few years Bulgaria

could, with some truth, claim that this fact was so.



Macedonia had been successively under Greek, Bulgar, and Serb, before

Turkish, rule, but the Macedonian Slavs had, under the last, been so cut

off both from Bulgars and Serbs, that ethnologically and linguistically

they did not develop the characteristics of either of these two races,

which originally belonged to the same southern Slav stock, but remained a

primitive neutral Slav type. If the Serbs had been first in the field

instead of the Bulgars, the Macedonian Slavs could just as easily have

been made into Serbs, sufficiently plausibly to convince the most knowing

expert. The well-known recipe for making a Macedonian Slav village Bulgar

is to add -ov or -ev (pronounced -off, -yeff) on to the names of all

the male inhabitants, and to make it Serb it is only necessary to add

further the syllable -ich, -ov and -ovich being respectively the

equivalent in Bulgarian and Serbian of our termination -son, e. g.

Ivanov in Bulgarian, and Jovanovit in Serbian = Johnson.



In addition to these three nations Rumania also entered the lists,

suddenly horrified at discovering the sad plight of the Vlakh shepherds,

who had probably wandered with unconcern about Macedonia with their herds

since Roman times. As their vague pastures could not possibly ever be

annexed to Rumania, their case was merely used in order to justify Rumania

in claiming eventual territorial compensation elsewhere at the final day

of reckoning. Meanwhile, their existence as a separate and authentic

nationality in Turkey was officially recognized by the Porte in 1906.



The stages of the Macedonian question up to 1908 must at this point be

quite briefly enumerated. Russia and Austria-Hungary, the two 'most

interested powers', who as far back as the eighteenth century had divided

the Balkans into their respective spheres of interest, east and west, came

to an agreement in 1897 regarding the final settlement of affairs in

Turkey; but it never reached a conclusive stage and consequently was never

applied. The Macedonian chaos meanwhile grew steadily worse, and the

serious insurrections of 1902-3, followed by the customary reprisals,

thoroughly alarmed the powers. Hilmi Pasha had been appointed

Inspector-General of Macedonia in December 1902, but was not successful in

restoring order. In October 1903 the Emperor Nicholas II and the Emperor

of Austria, with their foreign ministers, met at Muerzsteg, in Styria, and

elaborated a more definite plan of reform known as the Muerzsteg programme,

the drastic terms of which had been largely inspired by Lord Lansdowne,

then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the principal feature

was the institution of an international gendarmerie, the whole of

Macedonia being divided up into five districts to be apportioned among the

several great powers. Owing to the procrastination of the Porte and to the

extreme complexity of the financial measures which had to be elaborated in

connexion with this scheme of reforms, the last of the negotiations was

not completed, nor the whole series ratified, until April 1907, though the

gendarmerie officers had arrived in Macedonia in February 1904.



At this point again it is necessary to recall the position in regard to

this question of the various nations concerned. Great Britain and France

had no territorial stake in Turkey proper, and did their utmost to secure

reform not only in the vilayets of Macedonia, but also in the realm of

Ottoman finance. Italy's interest centred in Albania, whose eventual fate,

for geographical and strategic reasons, could not leave it indifferent.

Austria-Hungary's only care was by any means to prevent the aggrandizement

of the Serb nationality and of Serbia and Montenegro, so as to secure the

control, if not the possession, of the routes to Salonika, if necessary

over the prostrate bodies of those two countries which defiantly barred

Germanic progress towards the East. Russia was already fatally absorbed in

the Far Eastern adventure, and, moreover, had, ever since the war of 1878,

been losing influence at Constantinople, where before its word had been

law; the Treaty of Berlin had dealt a blow at Russian prestige, and Russia

had ever since that date been singularly badly served by its ambassadors

to the Porte, who were always either too old or too easy-going. Germany,

on the other hand, had been exceptionally fortunate or prudent in the

choice of its representatives. The general trend of German diplomacy in

Turkey was not grasped until very much later, a fact which redounds to the

credit of the German ambassadors at Constantinople. Ever since the

triumphal journey of William II to the Bosphorus in 1889, German

influence, under the able guidance of Baron von Radowitz, steadily

increased. This culminated in the regime of the late Baron Marschall von

Bieberstein, who was ambassador from 1897 to 1912. It was German policy to

flatter, support, and encourage Turkey in every possible way, to refrain

from taking part with the other powers in the invidious and perennial

occupation of pressing reforms on Abdul Hamid, and, above all, to give as

much pocket-money to Turkey and its extravagant ruler as they asked for.

Germany, for instance, refused to send officers or to have a district

assigned it in Macedonia in 1904, and declined to take part in the naval

demonstration off Mitylene in 1905. This attitude of Germany naturally

encouraged the Porte in its policy of delay and subterfuge, and Turkey

soon came to look on Germany as its only strong, sincere, and

disinterested friend in Europe. For the indefinite continuance of chaos

and bloodshed in Macedonia, after the other powers had really braced

themselves to the thankless task of putting the reforms into practice,

Germany alone was responsible.



The blow which King Ferdinand had inflicted on the prestige of the Young

Turks in October 1908, by proclaiming his independence, naturally lent

lustre to the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia. Serbia, baffled by the

simultaneous Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and maddened

by the elevation of Bulgaria to the rank of a kingdom (its material

progress had hitherto been discounted in Serbian eyes by the fact that it

was a mere vassal principality), seemed about to be crushed by the two

iron pots jostling it on either side. Its international position was at

that time such that it could expect no help or encouragement from western

Europe, while the events of 1909 (cf. p. 144) showed that Russia was not

then in a position to render active assistance. Greece, also screaming

aloud for compensation, was told by its friends amongst the great powers

that if it made a noise it would get nothing, but that if it behaved like

a good child it might some day be given Krete. Meanwhile Russia, rudely

awakened by the events of 1908 to the real state of affairs in the Near

East, beginning to realize the growth of German influence at

Constantinople, and seeing the unmistakable resuscitation of

Austria-Hungary as a great power, made manifest by the annexation of

Bosnia and Hercegovina, temporarily reasserted its influence in Bulgaria.

From the moment when Baron Aehrenthal announced his chimerical scheme of

an Austrian railway through the Sandjak of Novi Pazar in January 1908--

everybody knows that the railway already built through Serbia along the

Morava valley is the only commercially remunerative and strategically

practicable road from Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest to Salonika and

Constantinople--Russia realized that the days of the Muerzsteg programme

were over, that henceforward it was to be a struggle between Slav and

Teuton for the ownership of Constantinople and the dominion of the Near

East, and that something must be done to retrieve the position in the

Balkans which it was losing. After Baron Aehrenthal, in January 1909, had

mollified the Young Turks by an indemnity, and thus put an end to the

boycott, Russia in February of the same year liquidated the remains of the

old Turkish war indemnity of 1878 still due to itself by skilfully

arranging that Bulgaria should pay off its capitalized tribute, owed to

its ex-suzerain the Sultan, by very easy instalments to Russia instead.



The immediate effects of the Young Turk revolution amongst the Balkan

States, and the events, watched benevolently by Russia, which led to the

formation of the Balkan League, when it was joyfully realized that neither

the setting-up of parliamentary government, nor even the overthrow of

Abdul Hamid, implied the commencement of the millennium in Macedonia and

Thrace, have been described elsewhere (pp. 141, 148). King Ferdinand and

M. Venezelos are generally credited with the inception and realisation of

the League, though it was so secretly and skilfully concerted that it is

not yet possible correctly to apportion praise for the remarkable

achievement. Bulgaria is a very democratic country, but King Ferdinand,

owing to his sagacity, patience, and experience, and also thanks to his

influential dynastic connexions and propensity for travel, has always been

virtually his own foreign minister; in spite of the fact that he is a

large feudal Hungarian landlord, and has temperamental leanings towards

the Central European Empires, it is quite credible that King Ferdinand

devoted all his undeniable talents and great energy to the formation of

the League when he saw that the moment had come for Bulgaria to realize

its destiny at Turkey's expense, and that, if the other three Balkan

States could be induced to come to the same wise decision, it would be so

much the better for all of them. That Russia could do anything else than

whole-heartedly welcome the formation of the Balkan League was absolutely

impossible. Pan-Slavism had long since ceased to be the force it was, and

nobody in Russia dreamed of or desired the incorporation of any Balkan

territory in the Russian Empire. It is possible to control Constantinople

without possessing the Balkans, and Russia could only rejoice if a

Greco-Slavonic league should destroy the power of the Turks and thereby

make impossible the further advance of the Germanic powers eastward.



That Russia was ever in the least jealous of the military successes of the

league, which caused such gnashing of teeth in Berlin, Vienna, and

Budapest, is a mischievous fiction, the emptiness of which was evident to

any one who happened to be in Russia during the winter of 1912-13.



The years 1908 to 1912 were outwardly uneventful in Bulgaria, though a

great deal of quiet work was done in increasing the efficiency of the

army, and the material prosperity of the country showed no falling off.

Relations with the other Balkan States, especially with Serbia and

Montenegro, improved considerably, and there was ample room for such

improvement. This was outwardly marked by frequent visits paid to each

other by members of the several royal families of the three Slavonic

kingdoms of the Balkans. In May 1912 agreements for the eventual

delimitation of the provinces to be conquered from Turkey in the event of

war were signed between Bulgaria and Serbia, and Bulgaria and Greece. The

most controversial district was, of course, Macedonia. Bulgaria claimed

central Macedonia, with Monastir and Okhrida, which was the lion's share,

on ethnical grounds which have been already discussed, and it was expected

that Greece and Serbia, by obtaining other acquisitions elsewhere, would

consent to have their territories separated by the large Bulgarian wedge

which was to be driven between them. The exact future line of demarcation

between Serbian and Bulgarian territory was to be left to arbitration. The

possible creation of an independent Albania was not contemplated.



In August 1912 the twenty-fifth anniversary of King Ferdinand's arrival in

Bulgaria was celebrated with much rejoicing at the ancient capital of

Tirnovo, and was marred only by the news of the terrible massacre of

Bulgars by Turks at Kochana in Macedonia; this event, however, opportune

though mournful, tended considerably to increase the volume of the wave of

patriotism which swept through the country. Later in the same month Count

Berchtold startled Europe with his 'progressive decentralization' scheme

of reform for Macedonia. The manner in which this event led to the final

arrangements for the declaration of war on Turkey by the four Balkan

States is given in full elsewhere (cf. p. 151).



The Bulgarian army was fully prepared for the fray, and the autumn

manoeuvres had permitted the concentration unobserved of a considerable

portion of it, ready to strike when the time came. Mobilisation was

ordered on September 30, 1912. On October 8 Montenegro declared war on

Turkey. On October 13 Bulgaria, with the other Balkan States, replied to

the remonstrances of Russia and Austria by declaring that its patience was

at length exhausted, and that the sword alone was able to enforce proper

treatment of the Christian populations in European Turkey. On October 17

Turkey, encouraged by the sudden and unexpected conclusion of peace with

Italy after the Libyan war, declared war on Bulgaria and Serbia, and on

October 18 King Ferdinand addressed a sentimental exhortation to his

people to liberate their fellow-countrymen, who were still groaning under

the Crescent.



The number of Turkish troops opposing the Bulgarians in Thrace was about

180,000, and they had almost exactly the same number wherewith to oppose

the Serbians in Macedonia; for, although Macedonia was considered by the

Turks to be the most important theatre of war, yet the proximity of the

Bulgarian frontier to Constantinople made it necessary to retain a large

number of troops in Thrace. On October 19 the Bulgarians took the frontier

town of Mustafa Pasha. On October 24 they defeated the Turks at

Kirk-Kilisse (or Lozengrad), further east. From October 28 to November 2

raged the terrific battle of Lule-Burgas, which resulted in a complete and

brilliant victory of the Bulgarians over the Turks. The defeat and

humiliation of the Turks was as rapid and thorough in Thrace as it had

been in Macedonia, and by the middle of November the remains of the

Turkish army were entrenched behind the impregnable lines of Chataldja,

while a large garrison was shut up in Adrianople, which had been invested

by the end of October. The Bulgarian army, somewhat exhausted by this

brilliant and lightning campaign, refrained from storming the lines of

Chataldja, an operation which could not fail to involve losses such as the

Bulgarian nation was scarcely in a position to bear, and on December 3 the

armistice was signed. The negotiations conducted in London for two months

led, however, to no result, and on February 3, 1913, hostilities were

resumed. These, for the Bulgarians, resolved themselves into the more

energetic prosecution of the siege of Adrianople, which had not been

raised during the armistice. To their assistance Serbia, being able to

spare troops from Macedonia, sent 50,000 men and a quantity of heavy siege

artillery, an arm which the Bulgarians lacked. On March 26, 1913, the

fortress surrendered to the allied armies.



The Conference of London, which took place during the spring of that year,

fixed the new Turco-Bulgarian boundary by drawing the famous Enos-Midia

line, running between these two places situated on the shores respectively

of the Aegean and the Black Sea. This delimitation would have given

Bulgaria possession of Adrianople. But meanwhile Greece and especially

Serbia, which latter country had been compelled to withdraw from the

Adriatic coast by Austria, and was further precluded from ever returning

there by the creation of the independent state of Albania, determined to

retain possession of all that part of Macedonia, including the whole

valley of the Vardar with its important railway, which they had conquered,

and thus secure their common frontier. In May 1913 a military convention

was concluded between them, and the Balkan League, the relations between

the members of which had been becoming more strained ever since January,

finally dissolved. Bulgaria, outraged by this callous disregard of the

agreements as to the partition of Macedonia signed a year previously by

itself and its ex-allies, did not wait for the result of the arbitration

which was actually proceeding in Russia, but in an access of indignation

rushed to arms.



This second Balkan war, begun by Bulgaria during the night of June 30,

1913, by a sudden attack on the Serbian army in Macedonia, resulted in its

undoing. In order to defeat the Serbs and Greeks the south-eastern and

northern frontiers were denuded of troops. But the totally unforeseen

happened. The Serbs were victorious, defeating the Bulgars in Macedonia,

the Turks, seeing Thrace empty of Bulgarian troops, re-occupied

Adrianople, and the Rumanian army, determined to see fair play before it

was too late, invaded Bulgaria from the north and marched on Sofia. By the

end of July the campaign was over and Bulgaria had to submit to fate.



By the terms of the Treaty of Bucarest, which was concluded on August 10,

1913, Bulgaria obtained a considerable part of Thrace and eastern

Macedonia, including a portion of the Aegean coast with the seaport of

Dedeagach, but it was forced to 'compensate' Rumania with a slice of its

richest province (the districts of Dobrich and Silistria in north-eastern

Bulgaria), and it lost central Macedonia, a great part of which it would

certainly have been awarded by Russia's arbitration. On September 22,

1913, the Treaty of Constantinople was signed by Bulgaria and Turkey; by

its terms Turkey retained possession of Adrianople and of a far larger

part of Thrace than its series of ignominious defeats in the autumn of

1912 entitled it to.



In the fatal quarrel between Bulgaria and Serbia which caused the

disruption of the Balkan League, led to the tragic second Balkan war of

July 1913, and naturally left behind the bitterest feelings, it is

difficult to apportion the blame. Both Serbia and Bulgaria were

undoubtedly at fault in the choice of the methods by which they sought to

adjust their difference, but the real guilt is to be found neither in

Sofia nor in Belgrade, but in Vicuna and Budapest. The Balkan League

barred the way of the Germanic Powers to the East; its disruption weakened

Bulgaria and again placed Serbia at the mercy of the Dual Monarchy. After

these trying and unremunerative experiences it is not astonishing that the

Bulgarian people and its ambitious ruler should have retired to the remote

interior of their shell.



* * * * *



Explanation of Serbian orthography



c = ts

[)c] = ch (as in church)

['c] = " " " but softer

[)s] = sh

[)z] = zh (as z in azure)

gj = g (as in George)

j = y