which was started about the same time by the ennobled peasant, Tudor

Vladimirescu, for the emancipation of the lower classes, soon acquired,

therefore, an anti-Greek tendency. Vladimirescu was assassinated at the

instigation of the Greeks; the latter were completely checked by the

Turks, who, grown suspicious after the Greek rising and confronted with

the energetic attitude of the Rumanian nobility, consented in 1822 to the

nomination of two native boyards, Jonitza Sturdza and Gregory Ghica,

recommended by their countrymen, as princes of Moldavia and Wallachia. The

iniquitous system of 'the throne to the highest bidder' had come to an

end.



The period which marks the decline of Greek influence in the Rumanian

principalities also marks the growth of Russian influence; the first meant

economic exploitation, the second was a serious menace to the very

existence of the Rumanian nation. But if Russia seemed a possible future

danger, Turkey with its Phanariote following was a certain and immediate

menace. When, therefore, at the outbreak of the conflict with Turkey in

1828 the Russians once more passed the Pruth, the country welcomed them.

Indeed, the Rumanian boyards, who after the rising of 1821 and the Turkish

occupation had taken refuge in Transylvania, had even more than once

invited Russian intervention.[1] Hopes and fears alike were realized. By

the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) the rights of Turkey as suzerain were

limited to the exaction of a monetary tribute and the right of investiture

of the princes, one important innovation being that these last were to be

elected by national assemblies for life. But, on the other hand, a Russian

protectorate was established, and the provinces remained in Russian

military occupation up to 1834, pending the payment of the war indemnity

by Turkey. The ultimate aim of Russia may be open to discussion. Her

immediate aim was to make Russian influence paramount in the

principalities; this being the only possible explanation of the anomalous

fact that, pending the payment of the war indemnity, Russia herself was

occupying the provinces whose autonomy she had but now forcibly retrieved

from Turkey. The Reglement Organique, the new constitutional law given

to the principalities by their Russian governor, Count Kisseleff, truly

reflected the tendency. From the administrative point of view it was meant

to make for progress; from the political point of view it was meant to

bind the two principalities to the will of the Tsar. The personal charm of

Count Kisseleff seemed to have established as it were an unbreakable link

between Russians and Rumanians. But when he left the country in 1834 'the

liking for Russia passed away to be replaced finally by the two sentiments

which always most swayed the Rumanian heart: love for their country, and

affection towards France'.



[Footnote 1: Sec P. Eliade, Histoire de l'Esprit Public en Roumanie, i,

p. 167 et seq.]



French culture had been introduced into the principalities by the

Phanariote princes who, as dragomans of the Porte, had to know the

language, and usually employed French secretaries for themselves and

French tutors for their children. With the Russian occupation a fresh

impetus was given to French culture, which was pre-eminent in Russia at

the time; and the Russian officials, not speaking the language of the

country, generally employed French in their relations with the Rumanian

authorities, French being already widely spoken in Rumania. The contact

with French civilization, at an epoch when the Rumanians were striving to

free themselves from Turkish, Greek, and Russian political influence,

roused in them the sleeping Latin spirit, and the younger generation, in

constantly increasing numbers, flocked to Paris in search of new forms of

civilization and political life. At this turning-point in their history

the Rumanians felt themselves drawn towards France, no less by racial

affinity than by the liberal ideas to which that country had so

passionately given herself during several decades.



By the Treaty of Adrianople the Black Sea was opened to the commercial

vessels of all nations. This made for the rapid economic development of

the principalities by providing an outlet for their agricultural produce,

the chief source of their wealth. It also brought them nearer to western

Europe, which began to be interested in a nation whose spirit centuries of

sufferings had failed to break. Political, literary, and economic events

thus prepared the ground for the Rumanian Renascence, and when in 1848 the

great revolution broke out, it spread at once over the Rumanian countries,

where the dawn of freedom had been struggling to break since 1821. The

Rumanians of Transylvania rose against the tyranny of the Magyars; those

of Moldavia and Muntenia against the oppressive influence of Russia. The

movement under the gallant, but inexperienced, leadership of a few

patriots, who, significantly enough, had almost all been educated in

France, was, however, soon checked in the principalities by the joint

action of Russian and Turkish forces which remained in occupation of the

country. Many privileges were lost (Convention of Balta Liman, May 1,

1849); but the revolution had quickened the national sentiment of the

younger generation in all classes of society, and the expatriated leaders,

dispersed throughout the great capitals of Europe, strenuously set to work

to publish abroad the righteous cause of their country. In this they

received the enthusiastic and invaluable assistance of Edgar Quinet,

Michelet, Saint-Marc Girardin, and others.



This propaganda had the fortune to be contemporaneous and in agreement

with the political events leading to the Crimean War, which was entered

upon to check the designs of Russia. A logical consequence was the idea,

raised at the Paris Congress of 1856, of the union of the Rumanian

principalities as a barrier to Russian expansion. This idea found a

powerful supporter in Napoleon III, ever a staunch upholder of the

principle of nationality. But at the Congress the unexpected happened.

Russia favoured the idea of union, 'to swallow the two principalities at a

gulp,' as a contemporary diplomatist maliciously suggested; while Austria

opposed it strongly. So, inconceivably enough, did Turkey, whose attitude,

as the French ambassador at Constantinople, Thouvenel, put it, 'was less

influenced by the opposition of Austria than by the approval of

Russia'.[1] Great Britain also threw in her weight with the powers which

opposed the idea of union, following her traditional policy of preserving

the European equilibrium. The treaty of March 30, 1856, re-incorporated

with Moldavia the southern part of Bessarabia, including the delta of the

Danube, abolished the Russian protectorate, but confirmed the suzerainty

of Turkey--not unnaturally, since the integrity of the Ottoman Empire had

been the prime motive of the war. By prohibiting Turkey, however, from

entering Rumanian territory, save with the consent of the great powers, it

was recognized indirectly that the suzerainty was merely a nominal one.

Article 23 of the treaty, by providing that the administration of the

principalities was to be on a national basis, implicitly pointed to the

idea of union, as the organization of one principality independently of

the other would not have been national. But as the main argument of Turkey

and Austria was that the Rumanians themselves did not desire the union, it

was decided to convene in both principalities special assemblies (divans

ad hoc) representing all classes of the population, whose wishes were to

be embodied, by a European commission, in a report for consideration by

the Congress.



[Footnote 1: A. Xenopol, Unionistii si Separatistii (Paper read before

the Rumanian Academy), 1909.]



To understand the argument of the two powers concerned and the decision to

which it led, it must be borne in mind that the principalities were in the

occupation of an Austrian army, which had replaced the Russian armies

withdrawn in 1854, and that the elections for the assemblies were to be

presided over by Turkish commissaries. Indeed, the latter, in

collaboration with the Austrian consuls, so successfully doctored the

election lists,[1] that the idea of union might once more have fallen

through, had it not been for the invaluable assistance which Napoleon III

gave the Rumanian countries. As Turkish policy was relying mainly on

England's support, Napoleon brought about a personal meeting with Queen

Victoria and Prince Albert, at Osborne (August 1857), the result of which

was a compromise: Napoleon agreed to defer for the time being the idea of

an effective union of the two principalities, England undertaking, on the

other hand, to make the Porte cancel the previous elections, and proceed

to new ones after revision of the electoral lists. The corrupt Austrian

and Turkish influence on the old elections was best demonstrated by the

fact that only three of the total of eighty-four old members succeeded in

securing re-election. The assemblies met and proclaimed as imperatively

necessary to the future welfare of the provinces, their union, 'for no

frontier divides us, and everything tends to bring us closer, and nothing

to separate us, save the ill-will of those who desire to see us disunited

and weak'; further, a foreign hereditary dynasty, because 'the accession

to the throne of princes chosen from amongst us has been a constant

pretext for foreign interference, and the throne has been the cause of

unending feud among the great families of this country'. Moreover, if the

union of the two principalities was to be accomplished under a native

prince, it is obvious that the competition would have become doubly keen;

not to speak of the jealousies likely to be arousal between Moldavians and

Muntenians.



[Footnote 1: The edifying correspondence between the Porte and its

commissary Vorgorides regarding the arrangements for the Rumanian

elections fell into the hands of Rumanian politicians, and caused a great

sensation when it appeared in L'Etoile du Danube, published in Brussels

by Rumanian emigres.]



Such were the indisputable wishes of the Rumanians, based on knowledge of

men and facts, and arising out of the desire to see their country well

started on the high road of progress. But Europe had called for the

expression of these wishes only to get the question shelved for the

moment, as in 1856 everybody was anxious for a peace which should at all

costs be speedy. Consequently, when a second Congress met in Paris, in May

1858, three months of discussion and the sincere efforts of France only

resulted in a hybrid structure entitled the 'United Principalities'. These

were to have a common legislation, a common army, and a central committee

composed of representatives of both assemblies for the discussion of

common affairs; but were to continue to form two separate states, with

independent legislative and executive institutions, each having to elect a

prince of Rumanian descent for life.



Disappointed in their hopes and reasonable expectations, the Rumanians

adopted the principle of 'help yourself and God will help you', and

proceeded to the election of their rulers. Several candidates competed in

Moldavia. To avoid a split vote the name of an outsider was put forward

the day before the election, and on January 17, 1859, Colonel Alexander

Ioan Cuza was unanimously elected. In Wallachia the outlook was very

uncertain when the assembly met, amid great popular excitement, on

February 5. The few patriots who had realized that the powers, seeking

only their own interests, were consciously and of set purpose hampering

the emancipation of a long-suffering nation, put forth and urged the

election of Cuza, and the assembly unanimously adopted this spirited

suggestion. By this master-stroke the Rumanians had quietly accomplished

the reform which was an indispensable condition towards assuring a better

future. The political moment was propitious. Italy's military preparation

prevented Austria from intervening, and, as usual when confronted with an

accomplished fact, the great powers and Turkey finished by officially

recognizing the action of the principalities in December 1861. The central

commission was at once abolished, the two assemblies and cabinets merged

into one, and Bucarest became the capital of the new state 'Rumania'.



If the unsympathetic attitude of the powers had any good result, it was to

bring home for the moment to the Rumanians the necessity for national

unity. When the danger passed, however, the wisdom which it had evoked

followed suit. Cuza cherished the hope of realizing various ideal reforms.

Confronted with strong opposition, he did not hesitate to override the

constitution by dissolving the National Assembly (May 2, 1864) and

arrogating to himself the right, till the formation of a new Chamber, to

issue decrees which had all the force of law. He thus gave a dangerous

example to the budding constitutional polity; political passions were let

loose, and a plot organized by the Opposition led to the forced abdication

of Cuza on February 23, 1866. The prince left the country for ever a few

days later. No disturbance whatever took place, not one drop of blood was

shed.



A series of laws, mostly adapted from French models, was introduced by

Cuza. Under the Education Act of 1864 all degrees of education were free,

and elementary education compulsory. A large number of special and

technical schools were founded, as well as two universities, one at Jassy

(1860) and one at Bucarest (1864). After the coup d'etat of 1864

universal suffrage was introduced, largely as an attempt to 'swamp' the

fractious political parties with the peasant vote; while at the same time

a 'senate' was created as a 'moderating assembly' which, composed as it

was of members by right and members nominated by the prince, by its very

nature increased the influence of the crown. The chief reforms concerned

the rural question. Firstly, Cuza and his minister, Cogalniceanu,

secularized and converted to the state the domains of the monasteries,

which during the long period of Greek influence had acquired one-fifth of

the total area of the land, and were completely in the hands of the Greek

clergy (Law of December 13, 1863). More important still, as affecting

fundamentally the social structure of the country, was the Rural Law

(promulgated on August 26, 1864), which had been the cause of the conflict

between Cuza and the various political factions, the Liberals clamouring

for more thorough reforms, the Conservatives denouncing Cuza's project as

revolutionary. As the peasant question is the most important problem left

for Rumania to solve, and as I believe that, in a broad sense, it has a

considerable bearing upon the present political situation in that country,

it may not be out of place here to devote a little space to its

consideration.



Originally the peasant lived in the village community as a free

land-owner. He paid a certain due (one-tenth of his produce and three

days' labour yearly) to his leader (cneaz) as recompense for his

leadership in peace and war. The latter, moreover, solely enjoyed the

privilege of carrying on the occupations of miller and innkeeper, and the

peasant was compelled to mill with him. When after the foundation of the

principalities the upper class was established on a feudal basis, the

peasantry were subjected to constantly increasing burdens. Impoverished

and having in many cases lost their land, the peasants were also deprived

at the end of the sixteenth century of their freedom of movement. By that

time the cneaz, from being the leader of the community, had become the

actual lord of the village, and his wealth was estimated by the number of

villages he possessed. The peasant owners paid their dues to him in labour

and in kind. Those peasants who owned no land were his serfs, passing with

the land from master to master.



Under the Turkish domination the Rumanian provinces became the granary of

the Ottoman Empire. The value of land rose quickly, as did also the taxes.

To meet these taxes--from the payment of which the boyards (the

descendants of the cneazi) were exempt--the peasant owners had frequently

to sacrifice their lands; while, greedy after the increased benefits, the

boyards used all possible means to acquire more land for themselves. With

the increase of their lands they needed more labour, and they obtained

permission from the ruler not only to exact increased labour dues from the

peasantry, but also to determine the amount of work that should be done in

a day. This was effected in such a way that the peasants had, in fact, to

serve three and four times the number of days due.



The power to acquire more land from the freeholders, and to increase the

amount of labour due by the peasants, was characteristic of the

legislation of the eighteenth century. By a decree of Prince Moruzi, in

1805, the lords were for the first time empowered to reserve to their own

use part of the estate, namely, one-fourth of the meadow land, and this

privilege was extended in 1828 to the use of one-third of the arable land.

The remaining two-thirds were reserved for the peasants, every young

married couple being entitled to a certain amount of land, in proportion

to the number of traction animals they owned. When the Treaty of

Adrianople of 1829 opened the western markets to Rumanian corn, in which

markets far higher prices were obtainable than from the Turks, Rumanian

agriculture received an extraordinary impetus. Henceforth the efforts of

the boyards were directed towards lessening the amount of land to which

the peasants were entitled. By the Reglement Organique they succeeded in

reducing such land to half its previous area, at the same time maintaining

and exacting from the peasant his dues in full. It is in the same Act that

there appears for the first time the fraudulent title 'lords of the land',

though the boyards had no exclusive right of property; they had the use of

one-third of the estate, and a right to a due in labour and in kind from

the peasant holders, present or prospective, of the other two-thirds.



With a view to ensuring, on the one hand, greater economic freedom to the

land-owners, and, on the other, security for the peasants from the

enslaving domination of the upper class, the rural law of 1864 proclaimed

the peasant-tenants full proprietors of their holdings, and the

land-owners full proprietors of the remainder of the estate. The original

intention of creating common land was not carried out in the Bill. The

peasant's holding in arable land being small, he not infrequently ploughed

his pasture, and, as a consequence, had either to give up keeping beasts,

or pay a high price to the land-owners for pasturage. Dues in labour and

in kind were abolished, the land-owners receiving an indemnity which was

to be refunded to the state by the peasants in instalments within a period

of fifteen years. This reform is characteristic of much of the legislation

of Cuza: despotically pursuing the realization of some ideal reform,

without adequate study of and adaptation to social circumstances, his laws

provided no practical solution of the problem with which they dealt. In

this case, for example, the reform benefited the upper class solely,

although generally considered a boon to the peasantry. Of ancient right

two-thirds of the estate were reserved for the peasants; but the new law

gave them possession of no more than the strip they were holding, which

barely sufficed to provide them with the mere necessaries of life. The

remainder up to two-thirds of the estate went as a gift, with full

proprietorship; to the boyard. For the exemption of their dues in kind and

in labour, the peasants had to pay an indemnity, whereas the right of

their sons to receive at their marriage a piece of land in proportion to

the number of traction animals they possessed was lost without

compensation. Consequently, the younger peasants had to sell their labour,

contracting for periods of a year and upwards, and became a much easier

prey to the spoliation of the upper class than when they had at least a

strip of land on which to build a hut, and from which to procure their

daily bread; the more so as the country had no industry which could

compete with agriculture in the labour market. An investigation undertaken

by the Home Office showed that out of 1,265 labour contracts for 1906,

chosen at random, only 39.7 per cent, were concluded at customary wages;

the others were lower in varying degrees, 13.2 per cent. of the cases

showing wages upwards of 75 per cent. below the usual rates.



Under these conditions of poverty and economic serfdom the peasantry was

not able to participate in the enormous development of Rumanian

agriculture, which had resulted from increased political security and the

establishment of an extensive network of railways. While the boyards found

an increasing attraction in politics, a new class of middlemen came into

existence, renting the land from the boyards for periods varying generally

from three to five years. Owing to the resultant competition, rents

increased considerably, while conservative methods of cultivation kept

production stationary. Whereas the big cultivator obtained higher prices

to balance the increased cost of production, the peasant, who produced for

his own consumption, could only face such increase by a corresponding

decrease in the amount of food consumed. To show how much alive the rural

question is, it is enough to state that peasant risings occurred in 1888,

1889, 1894, 1900, and 1907; that new distributions of land took place in

1881 and 1889; that land was promised to the peasants as well at the time

of the campaign of 1877 as at that of 1913; and that more or less happily

conceived measures concerning rural questions have been passed in almost

every parliamentary session. The general tendency of such legislation

partook of the 'free contract' nature, though owing to the social

condition of the peasantry the acts in question had to embody protective

measures providing for a maximum rent for arable and pasture land, and a

minimum wage for the peasant labourer.



Solutions have been suggested in profusion. That a solution is possible no

one can doubt. One writer, basing his arguments on official statistics

which show that the days of employment in 1905 averaged only ninety-one

for each peasant, claims that only the introduction of circulating capital

and the creation of new branches of activity can bring about a change. The

suggested remedy may be open to discussion; but our author is undoubtedly

right when, asking himself why this solution has not yet been attempted,

he says: 'Our country is governed at present by an agrarian class.... Her

whole power rests in her ownership of the land, our only wealth. The

introduction of circulating capital would result in the disintegration of

that wealth, in the loss of its unique quality, and, as a consequence, in

the social decline of its possessors.'[1] This is the fundamental evil

which prevents any solution of the rural question. A small class of

politicians, with the complicity of a large army of covetous and

unscrupulous officials, live in oriental indolence out of the sufferings

of four-fifths of the Rumanian nation. Though elementary education is

compulsory, more than 60 per cent. of the population are still illiterate,

mainly on account of the inadequacy of the educational budget. Justice is

a myth for the peasant. Of political rights he is, in fact, absolutely

deprived. The large majority, and by far the sanest part of the Rumanian

nation, are thus fraudulently kept outside the political and social life

of the country. It is not surmising too much, therefore, to say that the

opportunity of emancipating the Transylvanians would not have been

wilfully neglected, had that part of the Rumanian nation in which the old

spirit still survives had any choice in the determination of their own

fate.



[Footnote 1: St. Antim, Cbestiunea Social[)a] [^i]n Rom[^a]nia, 1908, p.

214.]