Rumania And The Present War


(a) The Rumanians outside the Kingdom



The axis on which Rumanian foreign policy ought naturally to revolve is

the circumstance that almost half the Rumanian nation lives outside

Rumanian territory. As the available official statistics generally show

political bias it is not possible to give precise figures; but roughly

speaking there are about one million Rumanians in Bessarabia, a quarter of

a million in
Bucovina, three and a half millions in Hungary, while

something above half a million form scattered colonies in Bulgaria,

Serbia, and Macedonia. All these live in more or less close proximity to

the Rumanian frontiers.



That these Rumanian elements have maintained their nationality is due to

purely intrinsic causes. We have seen that the independence of Rumania in

her foreign relations had only recently been established, since when the

king, the factor most influential in foreign politics, had discouraged

nationalist tendencies, lest the country's internal development might be

compromised by friction with neighbouring states. The Government exerted

its influence against any active expression of the national feeling, and

the few 'nationalists' and the 'League for the cultural unity of all

Rumanians' had been, as a consequence, driven to seek a justification for

their existence in antisemitic agitation.



The above circumstances had little influence upon the situation in

Bucovina. This province forms an integral part of the Habsburg monarchy,

with which it was incorporated as early as 1775. The political situation

of the Rumanian principalities at the time, and the absence of a national

cultural movement, left the detached population exposed to Germanization,

and later to the Slav influence of the rapidly expanding Ruthene element.

That language and national characteristics have, nevertheless, not been

lost is due to the fact that the Rumanian population of Bucovina is

peasant almost to a man--a class little amenable to changes of

civilization.



This also applies largely to Bessarabia, which, first lost in 1812, was

incorporated with Rumania in 1856, and finally detached in 1878. The few

Rumanians belonging to the landed class were won over by the new masters.

But while the Rumanian population was denied any cultural and literary

activities of its own, the reactionary attitude of the Russian Government

towards education has enabled the Rumanian peasants to preserve their

customs and their language. At the same time their resultant ignorance has

kept them outside the sphere of intellectual influence of the mother

country.



The Rumanians who live in scattered colonies south of the Danube are the

descendants of those who took refuge in these regions during the ninth and

tenth centuries from the invasions of the Huns. Generally known as

Kutzo-Vlakhs, or, among themselves, as Aromuni, they are--as even Weigand,

who undoubtedly has Bulgarophil leanings, recognizes--the most intelligent

and best educated of the inhabitants of Macedonia. In 1905 the Rumanian

Government secured from the Porte official recognition of their separate

cultural and religious organizations on a national basis. Exposed as they

are to Greek influence, it will be difficult to prevent their final

assimilation with that people. The interest taken in them of late by the

Rumanian Government arose out of the necessity to secure them against

pan-Hellenic propaganda, and to preserve one of the factors entitling

Rumania to participate in the settlement of Balkan affairs.



I have sketched elsewhere the early history of the Rumanians of

Transylvania, the cradle of the Rumanian nation. As already mentioned,

part of the Rumanian nobility of Hungary went over to the Magyars, the

remainder migrating over the mountains. Debarred from the support of the

noble class, the Rumanian peasantry lost its state of autonomy, which

changed into one of serfdom to the soil upon which they toiled. Desperate

risings in 1324, 1437, 1514, 1600, and 1784 tended to case the Hungarian

oppression, which up to the nineteenth century strove primarily after a

political and religious hegemony. But the Magyars having failed in 1848 in

their attempt to free themselves from Austrian domination (defeated with

the assistance of a Russian army at Villagos, 1849), mainly on account of

the fidelity of the other nationalities to the Austrian Crown, they

henceforth directed their efforts towards strengthening their own position

by forcible assimilation of those nationalities. This they were able to

do, however, only after Koeniggraetz, when a weakened Austria had to give

way to Hungarian demands. In 1867 the Dual Monarchy was established, and

Transylvania, which up to then formed a separate duchy enjoying full

political rights, was incorporated with the new Hungarian kingdom. The

Magyars were handicapped in their imperialist ambitions by their numerical

inferiority. As the next best means to their end, therefore, they resorted

to political and national oppression, class despotism, and a complete

disregard of the principles of liberty and humanity.[1] Hungarian was made

compulsory in the administration, even in districts where the bulk of the

population did not understand that language. In villages completely

inhabited by Rumanians so-called 'State' schools were founded, in which

only Hungarian was to be spoken, and all children upwards of three years

of age had to attend them. The electoral regulations were drawn up in such

a manner that the Rumanians of Transylvania, though ten times more

numerous than the Magyars, sent a far smaller number than do the latter to

the National Assembly. To quash all protest a special press law was

introduced for Transylvania. But the Rumanian journalists being usually

acquitted by the juries a new regulation prescribed that press offences

should be tried only at Kluj (Klausenburg)--the sole Transylvanian town

with a predominating Hungarian population--a measure which was in

fundamental contradiction to the principles of justice.[2] In 1892 the

Rumanian grievances were embodied in a memorandum which was to have been

presented to the emperor by a deputation. An audience was, however,

refused, and at the instance of the Hungarian Government the members of

the deputation were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for having

plotted against the unity of the Magyar state.



[Footnote 1: The Rumanians inhabit mainly the province of Transylvania,

Banat, Crishiana, and Maramuresh. They represent 46.2 per cent. of the

total population of these provinces, the Magyars 32.5 per cent., the

Germans 11.5 per cent., and the Serbs 4.5 per cent. These figured are

taken from official Hungarian statistics, and it may therefore be assumed

that the Rumanian percentage represents a minimum.]



[Footnote 2: Over a period of 22 years (1886-1908) 850 journalists were

charged, 367 of whom were Rumanians; the sentences totalling 216 years of

imprisonment, the fines amounting to Fcs. 138,000.]



Notwithstanding these disabilities the Rumanians of Transylvania enjoyed a

long period of comparative social and economic liberty at a time when

Turkish and Phanariote domination was hampering all progress in Rumania.

Office under the Government growing increasingly difficult to obtain, the

Rumanians in Transylvania turned largely to commercial and the open

professions, and, as a result, a powerful middle class now exists. In

their clergy, both of the Orthodox and the Uniate Church--which last,

while conducting its ritual in the vernacular, recognizes papal supremacy--

the Rumanians have always found strong moral support, while the national

struggle tends to unite the various classes. The Rumanians of Hungary form

by far the sanest element in the Rumanian nation. From the Rumanians

within the kingdom they have received little beside sympathy. The

important part played by the country at the Peace of Bucarest, and her

detachment from Austria-Hungary, must necessarily have stimulated the

national consciousness of the Transylvanians; while at the same time all

hope for betterment from within must have ceased at the death of Archduke

Francis Ferdinand, an avowed friend of the long-suffering nationalities.

It is, therefore, no mere matter of conjecture that the passive attitude

of the Rumanian Government at the beginning of the present conflict must

have been a bitter disappointment to them.



(b) Rumania's Attitude



The tragic development of the crisis in the summer of 1914 threw Rumania

into a vortex of unexpected hopes and fears. Aspirations till then

considered little else than Utopian became tangible possibilities, while,

as suddenly, dangers deemed far off loomed large and near. Not only was

such a situation quite unforeseen, nor had any plan of action been

preconceived to meet it, but it was in Rumania's case a situation unique

from the number of conflicting considerations and influences at work

within it. Still under the waning influence of the thirty years

quasi-alliance with Austria, Rumania was not yet acclimatized to her new

relations with Russia. Notwithstanding the inborn sympathy with and

admiration for France, the Rumanians could not be blind to Germany's

military power. The enthusiasm that would have sided with France for

France's sake was faced by the influence of German finance. Sympathy with

Serbia existed side by side with suspicion of Bulgaria. Popular sentiment

clashed with the views of the king; and the bright vision of the

'principle of nationality' was darkened by the shadow of Russia as despot

of the Near East.



One fact in the situation stood out from the rest, namely, the unexpected

opportunity of redeeming that half of the Rumanian nation which was still

under foreign rule; the more so as one of the parties in the conflict had

given the 'principle of nationality' a prominent place in its programme.

But the fact that both Austria-Hungary and Russia had a large Rumanian

population among their subjects rendered a purely national policy

impossible, and Rumania could do nothing but weigh which issue offered her

the greater advantage.



Three ways lay open: complete neutrality, active participation on the side

of the Central Powers, or common cause with the Triple Entente. Complete

neutrality was advocated by a few who had the country's material security

most at heart, and also, as a pis aller, by those who realized that

their opinion that Rumania should make common cause with the Central

Powers had no prospect of being acted upon.



That King Carol favoured the idea of a joint action with Germany is likely

enough, for such a policy was in keeping with his faith in the power of

the German Empire. Moreover, he undoubtedly viewed with satisfaction the

possibility of regaining Bessarabia, the loss of which must have been

bitterly felt by the victor of Plevna. Such a policy would have met with

the approval of many Rumanian statesmen, notably of M. Sturdza, sometime

leader of the Liberal party and Prime Minister; of M. Carp, sometime

leader of the Conservative party and Prime Minister; of M. Maiorescu,

ex-Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, who presided at the Bucarest

Conference of 1913; of M. Marghiloman, till recently leader of the

Conservative party, to name only the more important. M. Sturdza, the old

statesman who had been one of King Carol's chief coadjutors in the making

of modern Rumania, and who had severed for many years his connexion with

active politics, again took up his pen to raise a word of warning. M.

Carp, the political aristocrat who had retired from public life a few

years previously, and had professed a lifelong contempt for the 'Press and

all its works', himself started a daily paper (Moldova) which, he

intended should expound his views. Well-known writers like M. Radu Rosetti

wrote[1] espousing the cause favoured by the king, though not for the

king's reasons: Carol had faith in Germany, the Rumanians mistrusted

Russia. They saw no advantage in the dismemberment of Austria, the most

powerful check to Russia's plans in the Near East. They dreaded the idea

of seeing Russia on the Bosphorus, as rendering illusory Rumania's

splendid position at the mouth of the Danube. For not only is a cheap

waterway absolutely necessary for the bulky products forming the chief

exports of Rumania; but these very products, corn, petroleum, and timber,

also form the chief exports of Russia, who, by a stroke of the pen, may

rule Rumania out of competition, should she fail to appreciate the

political leadership of Petrograd. Paris and Rome were, no doubt, beloved

sisters; but Sofia, Moscow, and Budapest were next-door neighbours to be

reckoned with.



[Footnote 1: See R. Rosetti, Russian Politics at Work in the Rumanian

Countries, facts compiled from French official documents, Bucarest,

1914.]



Those who held views opposed to those, confident in the righteousness of

the Allies' cause and in their final victory, advocated immediate

intervention, and to that end made the most of the two sentiments which

animated public opinion: interest in the fate of the Transylvanians, and

sympathy with France. They contended that though a purely national policy

was not possible, the difference between Transylvania and Bessarabia in

area and in number and quality of the population was such that no

hesitation was admissible. The possession of Transylvania was assured if

the Allies were successful; whereas Russia would soon recover if defeated,

and would regain Bessarabia by force of arms, or have it once more

presented to her by a Congress anxious to soothe her 'sentiment de dignite

blessee'. A Rumania enlarged in size and population had a better chance of

successfully withstanding any eventual pressure from the north, and it was

clear that any attempt against her independence would be bound to develop

into a European question. Rumania could not forget what she owed to France;

and if circumstances had made the Transylvanian question one 'a laquelle

on pense toujours et dont on ne parle jamais', the greater was the duty,

now that a favourable opportunity had arisen, to help the brethren across

the mountains. It was also a duty to fight for right and civilization,

proclaimed M. Take Ionescu, the exponent of progressive ideas in Rumanian

politics; and he, together with the prominent Conservative statesman, M.

Filipescu, who loathes the idea of the Rumanians being dominated by the

inferior Magyars, are the leaders of the interventionist movement. It was

due to M. Filipescu's activity, especially, that M. Marghiloman was forced

by his own party to resign his position as leader on account of his

Austrophil sentiments--an event unparalleled in Rumanian politics.



These were the two main currents of opinion which met in conflict at the

Crown Council--a committee ad hoc consisting of the Cabinet and the

leaders of the Opposition--summoned by the king early in August 1914, when

Rumania's neutrality was decided upon. The great influence which the Crown

can always wield under the Rumanian political system was rendered the more

potent in the present case by the fact that the Premier, M. Bratianu, is

above all a practical man, and the Liberal Cabinet over which he presides

one of the most colourless the country ever had: a Cabinet weak to the

point of being incapable of realizing its own weakness and the imperative

necessity at this fateful moment of placing the helm in the hands of a

national ministry. M. Bratianu considered that Rumania was too exposed,

and had suffered too much in the past for the sake of other countries, to

enter now upon such an adventure without ample guarantees. There would

always be time for her to come in. This policy of opportunism he was able

to justify by powerful argument. The supply of war material for the

Rumanian army had been completely in the hands of German and Austrian

arsenals, and especially in those of Krupp. For obvious reasons Rumania

could no longer rely upon that source; indeed, Germany was actually

detaining contracts for war and sanitary material placed with her before

the outbreak of the war. There was the further consideration that, owing

to the nature of Rumania's foreign policy in the past, no due attention

had been given to the defence of the Carpathians, nor to those branches of

the service dealing with mountain warfare. On the other hand, a continuous

line of fortifications running from Galatz to Focshani formed, together

with the lower reaches of the Danube, a strong barrier against attack from

the north. Rumania's geographical position is such that a successful

offensive from Hungary could soon penetrate to the capital, and by cutting

the country in two could completely paralyse its organization. Such

arguments acquired a magnified importance in the light of the failure of

the negotiations with Bulgaria, and found many a willing ear in a country

governed by a heavily involved landed class, and depending almost

exclusively in its banking organization upon German and Austrian capital.



From the point of view of practical politics only the issue of the

conflict will determine the wisdom or otherwise of Rumania's attitude.

But, though it is perhaps out of place to enlarge upon it here, it is

impossible not to speak of the moral aspect of the course adopted. By

giving heed to the unspoken appeal from Transylvania the Rumanian national

spirit would have been quickened, and the people braced to a wholesome

sacrifice. Many were the wistful glances cast towards the Carpathians by

the subject Rumanians, as they were being led away to fight for their

oppressors; but, wilfully unmindful, the leaders of the Rumanian state

buried their noses in their ledgers, oblivious of the fact that in these

times of internationalism a will in common, with aspirations in common, is

the very life-blood of nationality. That sentiment ought not to enter into

politics is an argument untenable in a country which has yet to see its

national aspirations fulfilled, and which makes of these aspirations

definite claims. No Rumanian statesman can contend that possession of

Transylvania is necessary to the existence of the Rumanian state. What

they can maintain is that deliverance from Magyar oppression is vital to

the existence of the Transylvanians. The right to advance such a claim

grows out of their very duty of watching over the safety of the subject

Rumanians. 'When there are squabbles in the household of my

brother-in-law,' said the late Ioan Bratianu when speaking on the

Transylvanian question, 'it is no affair of mine; but when he raises a

knife against his wife, it is not merely my right to intervene, it is my

duty.' It is difficult to account for the obliquity of vision shown by so

many Rumanian politicians. 'The whole policy of such a state [having a

large compatriot population living in close proximity under foreign

domination] must be primarily influenced by anxiety as to the fate of

their brothers, and by the duty of emancipating them,' affirms one of the

most ardent of Rumanian nationalist orators; and he goes on to assure us

that 'if Rumania waits, it is not from hesitation as to her duty, but

simply in order that she may discharge it more completely'.[1] Meantime,

while Rumania waits, regiments composed almost completely of

Transylvanians have been repeatedly and of set purpose placed in the

forefront of the battle, and as often annihilated. Such could never be the

simple-hearted Rumanian peasant's conception of his duty, and here, as in

so many other cases in the present conflict, the nation at large must not

be judged by the policy of the few who hold the reins.



[Footnote 1: Quarterly Review, London, April, 1915, pp. 449-50.]



Rumania's claims to Transylvania are not of an historical nature. They are

founded upon the numerical superiority of the subject Rumanians in

Transylvania, that is upon the 'principle of nationality', and are morally

strengthened by the treatment the Transylvanians suffer at the hands of

the Magyars. By its passivity, however, the Rumanian Government has

sacrificed the prime factor of the 'principle of nationality' to the

attainment of an object in itself subordinate to that factor; that is, it

has sacrificed the 'people' in order to make more sure of the 'land'. In

this way the Rumanian Government has entered upon a policy of acquisition;

a policy which Rumania is too weak to pursue save under the patronage of

one or a group of great powers; a policy unfortunate inasmuch as it will

deprive her of freedom of action in her external politics. Her policy

will, in its consequences, certainly react to the detriment of the

position acquired by the country two years ago, when independent action

made her arbiter not only among the smaller Balkan States, but also among

those and her late suzerain, Turkey.



Such, indeed, must inevitably be the fate of Balkan politics in general.

Passing from Turkish domination to nominal Turkish suzerainty, and thence

to independence within the sphere of influence of a power or group of

powers, this gradual emancipation of the states of south-eastern Europe

found its highest expression in the Balkan League. The war against Turkey

was in effect a rebellion against the political tutelage of the powers.

But this emancipation was short-lived. By their greed the Balkan States

again opened up a way to the intrusion of foreign diplomacy, and even, as

we now see, of foreign troops. The first Balkan war marked the zenith of

Balkan political emancipation; the second Balkan war was the first act in

the tragic debacle out of which the present situation developed. The

interval between August 1913 (Peace of Bucarest) and August 1914 was

merely an armistice during which Bulgaria and Turkey recovered their

breath, and German and Austrian diplomacy had time to find a pretext for

war on its own account.



'Exhausted but not vanquished we have had to furl our glorious standards

in order to await better days,' said Ferdinand of Bulgaria to his soldiers

after the conclusion of the Peace of Bucarest; and Budapest, Vienna, and

Berlin have no doubt done their best to keep this spirit of revenge alive

and to prevent a renascence of the Balkan Alliance. They have succeeded.

They have done more: they have succeeded in causing the 'principle of

nationality'--that idea which involves the disruption of Austria--to be

stifled by the very people whom it was meant to save. For whilst the

German peoples are united in this conflict, the majority of the southern

Slavs, in fighting the German battles, are fighting to perpetuate the

political servitude of the subject races of Austria-Hungary.



However suspicious Rumania may be of Russia, however bitter the quarrels

between Bulgars, Greeks, and Serbs, it is not, nor can it ever be natural,

that peoples who have groaned under Turkish despotism for centuries

should, after only one year of complete liberation, join hands with an old

and dreaded enemy not only against their fellow sufferers, but even

against those who came 'to die that they may live'. These are the Dead Sea

fruits of dynastic policy. Called to the thrones of the small states of

the Near East for the purpose of creating order and peace, the German

dynasties have overstepped their function and abused the power entrusted

to them. As long as, in normal times, political activities were confined

to the diplomatic arena there was no peril of rousing the masses out of

their ignorant indolence; but, when times are abnormal, it is a different

and a dangerous thing to march these peoples against their most intimate

feelings. When, as the outcome of the present false situation, sooner or

later the dynastic power breaks, it will then be for the powers who are

now fighting for better principles not to impose their own views upon the

peoples, or to place their own princes upon the vacant thrones. Rather

must they see that the small nations of the Near East are given a chance

to develop in peace and according to their proper ideals; that they be not

again subjected to the disintegrating influence of European diplomacy; and

that, above all, to the nations in common, irrespective of their present

attitude, there should be a just application of the 'principle of

nationality'.



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